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Legal Workers and paralegals - new avenues for services? Access to Justice 
and the introduction of the NFP Sector1 
 
Peter Sanderson and Hilary Sommerlad 
 
Introduction 
 
Access to Justice is a portmanteau term, encompassing issues as diverse as 
accessibility of court procedures for dispute resolution, ‘equality of arms’ in criminal 
justice proceedings, and the development of accessible alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) procedures (Parker, 1999, p 30). One of the significant developments of the 
last decade has been the shift in its meaning away from access to case-by-case 
delivery through private solicitors towards salaried, often non-legally qualified 
advisors in advice centres, effectively returning us to the original post war vision of 
legal aid (Goriely, 1996, p. 224).   This shift in emphasis is reinforced in the Ministry of Justice’s affirmation of the promotion of ADR, and the use of information and 
advice as a prophylactic for social problems (Falconer, 2007, p. 16). 
 
In this sense, the entry of advice providers from the Not for Profit (NFP) and 
Voluntary and Community Organisations (VCO)2  Sector can be regarded as an 
overdue development, as was the initiative to explore alternative methods of advice 
provision other than face to face case work (Bull and Seargeant, 1996)   The 
perception that the existing system of legal aid provision was failing to meet the 
needs of a substantial section of the population was given added force by Hazel Genn’s  ‘Paths to Justice’ (1999).  Published shortly after the Access to Justice Act 
(AJA) 1999, this revealed simultaneously a considerable amount of ‘unmet legal need’ and ignorance about the functioning of the legal system and courts (see too 
Pleasence et al, 2004), and has been followed by detailed accounts which have 
identified concentrations of civil justice problems in vulnerable groups (Buck et al, 
2004; Buck et al, 2005; Moorhead and Robinson, 2006).  A thrust of this work, and of the joint papers by the Law Centres Federation (LCF) and the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department and its successor the Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA/LCF 2004 ), was that advice had a central role to play in meeting the government’s 
objective of combating social exclusion: through the empowerment of excluded 
groups and individuals; through increasing the material resources available to these 
communities; and by providing a counter balance to the discretionary decision 
making on the part of the State to which these groups are particularly subject. 
 
These developments form the backdrop to the shift of emphasis in legal aid provision 
heralded by the AJA 1999, as contracts for areas of law like debt, housing and 
welfare rights were greatly expanded, and contractors from the NFP sector were 
drawn into publicly funded provision in unprecedented numbers.3  At the same time, 
                                                 
1 The authors wish to express their gratitude to the DCA for supporting the research which 
gave rise to this paper and in particular we would like to thank Judith Sidaway, Michelle Diver 
and Mavis Maclean for their support. 
2 The term Not for Profit is used to indicate a sector that includes both Voluntary and 
Community Organizations (VCOs) and Law Centres.  The term VCO applies to organizations like the Advice Services Alliance and the Citizen’s Advice Bureau, which have both a different 
legal status and are not subject currently to the same regulatory regime. 
3 At the time of the research (2004-5), excluding Law Centres, around 400 NFP agencies had 
contracts with the LSC to provide legal advice and assistance to eligible clients: the largest 
provider among these is Citizen’s Advice, with approximately 200 Bureaux participating (of 
which around 80 employ solicitors).  Shelter had 40 or so offices with contracts to provide 
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there has been a substantial decline in the matter starts awarded to solicitors in the 
areas of consumer, debt, housing, welfare benefits and asylum, in all of which areas 
the NFP sector saw at least a corresponding increase (HoC, SCCA, 2004, we49, op 
cit, p 11). 
 
However, recent developments since the Carter Review (2006) can be seen as 
representing an even more significant shift in emphasis with the declared intention of 
the Legal Services Commission (LSC) to ‘roll out’ Community Legal Advice Centres 
(CLACs), to date being piloted in Leicester and Gateshead, across the country, with 
the aim of enhancing accessibility in the most deprived urban areas (Explanatory 
memorandum to The Community Legal Service (Funding) (Amendment) Order 2006 
No 2366).  These developments have sparked considerable debate in Parliament and amongst stakeholder groups.  Whilst 47% of respondents to ‘Making Legal Rights a reality’ supported the proposals to pilot CLACs and CLANs (LSC, 2006, p. 8),  
stakeholders from the VCO sector expressed anxiety over: the impact of the 
contracting process on existing networks, and the business undertaken by VCOs not 
covered by the contract, such as representation, outreach work and social policy 
work (ASA 2006, p 3); the impact of the concentration of supply (Citizens Advice, 
2006, p 3); the impact on consumer choice (op. cit., p 11). 
 
We do not propose to follow the detail of this debate, but will instead explore the 
way in which the findings of our own research may illuminate certain aspects of it.  
We will reflect on our analysis of this data to interrogate the proposition that the 
engagement of the NFP sector has resulted in new avenues for service delivery, and 
will suggest that whilst this may be true from the viewpoint of the State as a 
monopoly purchaser of services, the development of new forms of delivery may close 
off some avenues, both through the well understood mechanism of restricting scope, 
and also through the less well understood effects of change on local networks, the 
internal organization of firms and VCOs, and the relationship between advice tiers.  
In the section below we briefly describe the research methods used to gather the 
data on which the paper draws; in the subsequent sections we consider the question 
of new avenues firstly from the point of view of the added value it was thought that 
the NFP sector would bring to publicly funded legal services and secondly from the 
perspective of the effect of contracting on inter and intra-organisational links. 
 
Section 1: Methods 
 
The study was based primarily on the collection of qualitative data through interview 
and observation, undertaken with a limited number of FP firms and NFP agencies in a 
region of Northern England.  The region included small towns, big cities and rural 
areas; the firms included some highly specialized legal aid firms, and some medium 
sized practices with contracts for advice in several specialist areas.  NFP agencies 
included Citizens Advice Bureaux, two housing advice agencies, a Women’s Centre 
and a Law Centre.  We interviewed advisers, and observed advice sessions in the 
specialisms of Housing, Family, Child Care, Community Care, Immigration, 
                                                                                                                                                 
housing advice, while the residue was spread between a number of different specialist advice 
agencies.  Overall the NFP sector contractors start around 115,000 cases annually, 22% of the 
total acts of assistance (House of Commons Select Committee for Constitutional Affairs (HoC 
SCCA, 2004, we 48, p. 6), and in 2004-5 the NFP sector were awarded 942 out of a total of 
6242 contracts.  Between 2003-4 and 2004-5 the number of contracts awarded to the NFP sector rose by 11.3%, while the number of contracts awarded to Solicitors’ firms declined by 
9.9% (HoC, SCCA, 2004, we49, p 10).   
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Employment, Civil Litigation, Welfare Benefits, Debt, Personal Injury and Domestic 
Violence.  A total of 64 respondents, working in 12 solicitors’ firms, one law centre, 
seven VCOs and one local authority welfare rights service, were interviewed, several 
more than once, each interview lasting between one and two hours. 
 
The status of the sample is given in the table below: 
 
Respondent Category FP Sector NFP Sector TOTAL 
Senior Partner/Director 10 7 17 
Non-partner contract manager 
Training Manager 
3 3 6 
Supervisor 2 4 6 
Supervisees 10 8 18 
Trainees/volunteers 1 3 4 
Training Organisations 2 6 8 
Committee members  1 1 
LSC personnel 4  4 
TOTAL 32 32 64 
 
The sample represented a range of front line specialist advisers as well as managers, 
broadly reflecting those specialisms for which the LSC contracted for most 
commonly: 
 
Specialism FP respondents NFP respondents 
Housing 3 8 
Welfare Benefits 0 3 
Community Care 1 0 
Immigration 3 0 
Domestic Violence 0 3 
Personal Injury 1 0 
Family 5 2 
Employment 2 1 
Civil Litigation 3 0 
Debt 0 1 
Children 1 0 Women’s Advice & Guidance 
(PIB) 
0 3 
Asian Women’s A & G 0 2 
 
Triangulation of methods included respondent triangulation, where for example 
accounts of different participants in a Community Legal Service Partnership (CLSP), 
LSC and agency staff, supervisee and supervisor, or advisor and client, were cross-
checked; data triangulation, where for example interview accounts of approaches to 
advice were cross-checked against observations; and time series triangulation, 
where agency accounts were checked at more than one point in time. 
 
Section 2: Contracting and the values base of the NfP sector 
 
The 1990s saw the increasing involvement in service delivery by the VCO sector, 
and, in the early period of the Labour Government, a shift in emphasis towards ‘partnership’ and a ‘compact’ (Plowden, 2003).  Much of the writing on this 
development has stressed that the attraction for the State has been the ‘added 
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value’ provided by the VCO’s resources of social capital, the more reciprocal 
relationship they enjoy with their user groups and the moral foundation of their ‘missions’, which form an alternative to the profit-oriented business ethic, and the 
perception of public services as organized around the interest of producers (see for 
example Kendall and Knapp 2001).    
 
A combination of these values and expertise based rationales were advanced to 
support greater NFP involvement in the legal aid; for instance, the sector was viewed 
as more committed to the cause of socially excluded clients, enjoying better 
relationships with clients as a result of advisors’ superior interpersonal skills and 
empathy (Stein, 2004), and producing better quality advice both because of its 
extended experience in areas of law neglected by private practice, and also because 
of the way in which values and skills combined to produce a greater expenditure of 
time per client problem.   
 
These perceptions were partially confirmed by Genn’s evidence that the socially 
excluded are difficult to reach through case based work by solicitors (1999, p 101), and by Moorhead et al’s research which suggested that the NFP sector was better at 
dealing with some of the problems associated with social welfare law, and which 
found greater numbers of NFP agencies performing at higher levels of quality than 
solicitor contractors4 (2001, p. 214).   
 
However, as VCO involvement in service delivery increased, both the rhetoric of 
partnership and the emphasis on added value have been gradually eclipsed by the 
need to ensure Value for Money (VFM) in the funding arrangements reached with the 
NFP sector. The shift in the role of the state in service delivery, towards regulated 
devolution,5  has been felt particularly keenly as the techniques of New Public 
Management (NPM) have been extended to cover their activities.  This has meant 
that many of the aspects of NFP/VCO provision, which both its members (along with 
other commentators)  believed would provide  added value to legal service delivery, are now in tension with the state’s desire to limit what it will pay for to a core 
service, meeting only those aspects of need which have been centrally endorsed.  
This tension has generated a considerable literature about the appropriate 
governance of the NFP sector: specifically, whether the approach developed to 
assure quality of advice in the For Profit (FP) sector is appropriate for all providers.   
 
A key element in the development and maintenance of externally-regulated 
standards has been the LAFQAS and the subsequent Quality Mark (QM) for the 
Criminal Defence Service (CDS), the Community Legal Service (CLS) and the Bar.   
The design and development of these measures was accompanied by extensive 
research, which included comparisons of the FP and NFP sectors (Moorhead et al 
2001). One obvious consequence of the extended role of the LSC in commissioning 
provision from the NFP sector has been the development of concordance between 
                                                 
4 Although Moorhead et al also found that the NFP agencies were slightly more likely to be 
included in those operating below threshold competence (2001, p 214).  Subsequent work by 
Moorhead et al (2003) explored the issue of distinctions between the kind of contracted work 
taken on by For Profit (FP) and NFP agencies, testing the proposition that solicitors were more likely to provide quality by taking on ‘higher level’ work, whilst the NFP sector were more likely 
to innovate and provide a holistic service.  Their findings did not confirm this simplistic set of 
assumptions, but rather revealed a more confusing picture: in some areas, such as welfare 
law, solicitors were likely to avoid pursuing more complex claims, while NFP agencies sought 
adversarial solutions through tribunals.   
5 Hood (1999); and see Rhodes (1997)  
 5 
the quality and audit regimes of the NFP sector and QM. 6  By 2000, this factor, in 
combination with the policy drive towards large scale inclusion of NFP sector in the 
CLS, meant that LAFQAS had become a major influence on NFP sector in terms of 
the redesign of their quality regimes (see for instance the Advice Services Alliance 
mapping exercises, 2000).  
 
Respondents in management roles were unanimous in attributing considerable 
benefits to these regimes in terms of enhancing the systems in their organizations, 
even where they identified gaps, inadequacies or inconsistencies in the process.  In 
several cases they identified the introduction of QM and audits as a means of 
effecting cultural transformations in staff that they found difficult to shift on their 
own.  The tendency was also noted by the regional manager at the LSC: 
lots of Heads of Department say the audit is not a bad thing because it 
keeps people on their toes.   They use it as a whip, though it’s very rarely said in public but we do find that if we say we really don’t feel 
we need to audit you this year, that people say, oh could you do a day 
in such and such a department because they need it.   
 
In one CAB, the contract manager identified the process as helpful with staff who 
found the idea of supervision unattractive: I’m very strict about my supervision of them because it’s prescribed in 
the manual what I do and the other staff I manage I like to make sure that they’re supervised as regularly as well.  A purely personal thing 
because I think its very easy not to have supervision meetings but if 
you get into the habit like the rest of it and tick them off and so on, its 
very easy to let these things sort of go because you always have a 
waiting room full of clients so that tends to get missed.  Some people don’t like being supervised, as they have been doing the same job all the time and think ‘well I don’t need to be supervised’ so yes I think 
some of these things, I would say yes, as a result of the LSC probably 
more than Citizens Advice. (Contract Manager, CAB) 
 
QM was also commended for bringing greater rigour to the process of file and case 
management in organizations where previously recording practices had been 
inconsistent: 
Caseworkers in general I think – others are – or tend to be – fairly slap dash (the ones I’ve met) and keep details about their client in 
their head.  LSC makes you put it all down on paper.  Then if you are run over by a bus somebody can carry on.  It’s a much more … it 
makes you put it down , and when I do file reviews I can see what they’ve done, when they’ve done it and how much time it’s taken, 
and, yes, I think it makes them look at their work in a different way. 
(Contract Manager, Urban CAB) 
 
I think that in more cases now, a client will go away with a clear idea of the experience they’ve had in our office, with a clearer contract of 
what they can expect from us, and what we should expect from them, 
so moving away from that very almost kind of woolly ill defined 
experience that a person will often get when they go to a CAB and 
                                                 
6 Although the NFP sector was developing interest in quality prior to introduction of 
Franchising, this interest was given major impetus by Franchising (see Thornton, 1991; Steele 
& Bull, 1996) 
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speak to an experienced volunteer who will not write up their notes very accurately; we’ve come a long way from there and we can now 
safely say that most of - certainly most the cases  we do for the LSC 
will be done to a fairly high standard, include client care letters; include a clear closure procedure on a case, that it won’t be arbitrarily 
closed because somebody in an administration function wants to get 
rid of all the open cases from last year or whatever.  It doesn’t happen 
like that any more, certainly not for the LSC cases.  So that has been a good thing there’s been – it’s driven us towards a better 
understanding, a better grasping of professional principles as they 
apply to providing advice and advocacy and I’m very pleased about 
that. (Specialist Housing Adviser, Housing Advice Charity). 
  
The SQM was also widely recognised as providing a discipline to client care, although 
this recognition was rather more grudging: 
rolling out the Quality Mark, it was a real difficult process with six area 
teams and the main anxiety I think was it would get in the way of 
achieving results, it would slow people down, it would make people do 
things that were unnecessary and be a bureaucratic approach.  I think that when all the hot air’s dissipated, I don’t think hopefully it’s not made 
a major difference.  Opening letters is something that we took on board as 
good practice a number of years ago anyway.  What it probably has meant 
is that some people who decided to not to bother with opening letters, they’ve been kind of brought in to line, so it’s more consistent use of opening letters, there’s more consistent use of closing letter.  So it has 
structured peoples casework, hopefully in a way that’s not impacted on what’s kind of motivating them which is actually getting results. (Manager, 
Welfare Rights Advice Service). 
 
Another of the procedural benefits identified in the NFP sector as flowing from LSC 
contracting was the fact that improvements in file management made it easier to 
transfer responsibility for a case: reference was made to times in the past where 
case workers had left leaving files behind with totally inadequate information to 
enable another caseworker to proceed.  Again, weaknesses in recording were 
highlighted by one housing solicitor as a key failing in the NFP sector: We’ve had instances – people coming to us where they’ve been ill advised.  We’ve then appealed their case and unpicked what’s happened and 
frequently found that where a voluntary sector person has been involved 
no note has been made of the judgment – we had an instance where we 
succeeded on appeal purely because no one had any idea of what the 
judge had said – because no one had taken a note… (Housing specialist) 
 
However other aspects of QM were viewed less positively.  In particular, its reliance 
of on proxy measurements was also felt to erode the NFP’s value base because they 
tended to devalue ‘the immeasurable aspects of work ... in favour of the measurable’ 
(Raine, l993, p 87; and see Power, l997, p 13). For instance, the ‘soft skills’ are least 
easily measured by QA regimes and are yet often regarded as particularly valuable 
attributes of the NFP sector Stein, 2004; McAteer, 2000); as a result, several of our 
informants argued that the LSC approach failed to recognise the added value 
embodied in important aspects of their work.   Social policy work was offered as 
another example of what was felt to be a failure to support an avenue of service 
which many organisations (for instance Citizen’s Advice and Age Concern) viewed as 
a key aspect of their mission.  This perspective is supported by Jochum et al who 
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have argued with respect to the relationship between government and the VCO 
sector generally that despite the rhetoric, insufficient attention has in practice been 
paid to its ‘wider contribution to civil renewal’ and that instead the sector has been seen ‘primarily as ‘delivery agents’ promoting choice rather than voice’ (2004, p 34) 
 
The sector was also more negative about the effects of the contract, many of which 
they had not anticipated.  These included effects which have been identified by other 
research and include the way in which funding timeframes may distort priorities, 
and, where the funding is uncertain,  create difficulties in managing the skill-set of 
the workforce7: ‘the result is often poor value for money, for both contractor and 
organisation, financial instability and uncertainty, difficulties in recruitment and 
retention of staff, a focus on shorter term outputs rather than longer term change and diversion from the business of delivering better services’ (Alcock et al, p.27).  
For instance advice organizations with limited access to alternative funds (such as a 
Local Authority funding stream) or which were heavily dependent on uncertain 
recurring grants would find it difficult to maintain a critical mass of advice expertise 
in any one area, and would therefore be heavily dependent on LSC funding to 
support specialist work 
 
The standardized and complex nature of contracts between government and VCO 
organizations has been described by Alcock as revealing a ‘one sided and inflexible 
approach to contracting on the part of statutory agencies that show themselves 
unreceptive to ideas from VCOs about the specification of services ..’ (op cit., pp 29-
30). They generally also have a built-in funding deficit, which, coupled with annually 
renewable contracts creates considerable financial insecurity, transfers high levels of 
risk onto VCOs and is, some commentators argue, unsustainable, ‘particularly in 
relation to the delivery of non-profit making services to vulnerable groups by non-profit making organisation’ (op cit, p 32) Evidence suggests that highly unstable 
funding relationships also undermine trust between contractors and VCOs (ibid), and 
this was confirmed by the experiences of some of our NFP respondents. 
 
However the major impact of contracting was felt to be an insidious ‘colonisation’ of 
the NFP ethos.  Michael Power identifies two extremes of response to audit 
processes. One is ‘decoupling’ where the audited organization seeks to manage the 
process by delegating responsibility for dealing with the audit to a specialized section 
or sub-set, but: 
The other extreme to consider is that the values and practices which 
make auditing possible penetrate deep into the core of organizational 
operations, not just in terms of requiring energy and resources to 
conform to new reporting demands but in the creation over time of 
new mentalities, new incentives and perceptions of significance. 
(1997, p 97) 
 
The impact of the LSC contract and associated auditing clearly illustrate the potential 
of  this form of regulation to have a major cultural impact which extends beyond the 
relative weight of the funding: 
They do hold a lot of clout - funders do anyway, but the LSC do hold a 
remarkable amount of influence  for what they actually put into 
organisations, phenomenal.  Out of proportion I would say, and   that’s quite clever, quite good from their point of view and I do 
support the Specialist Quality Mark and the impact it has had.  I think 
                                                 
7 This point is discussed further in Section 2 
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there are a lot of strengths to that. They need to be aware of that 
sometimes, because the audit regimes they run are very tough.  The 
amount of influence that they can have for the amount of pounds they 
are putting in organisations is quite large.  The local authority put in a 
lot more money than the LSC but the LSC, in terms of actual advice 
and quality, are awful lot more influential than the local authority. 
(Director, specialist Housing NFP organization). 
 
The evidence from both NFP respondents and the LSC suggested that this process of 
colonisation was not initially particularly marked, in part because the priority at first 
was to bring the sector into legal aid work and thereby meet market need: 
the NFP agencies we brought into the scheme on a pilot basis where the LSC’s initial approach – or the LAB as it was then - was to bring in a 
relatively small number, – take probably their more confident, judicious  
auditors / account managers and bring them in .. not treat them with 
kid gloves, but, you know, very educational – don’t blow them out if they’re not meeting the standards, help them to meet the standards, 
get them there.  And for a long time – there is a feeling in the 
Commission that the NFP agencies have probably been pretty indulged 
..   My instinct says that there will be a greater parity of expectation and 
it is the case still that in some NFP agencies I think the introduction of 
the NFP contracts has driven a degree of professionalisation of advice 
but is not uniformly impacted in the agencies (LSC Regional Manager) 
 
However the very values which were originally viewed as the benefits  brought by 
the sector to publicly funded legal services, such as its commitment to social justice, campaigning and the ‘holistic’ approach to putting the client first, produce costs and 
thus, as we noted above, are in potential tension with the emphasis on VFM.  
Controlling costs through exercising control over the time expended by advisors 
therefore became a major concern for commissioners of public services, and it 
appeared that there was an increasing tendency to view the NFP distinctive values 
base in terms of  
a cultural problem ..  it  just doesn’t work in the world as it is now.  
There are people there whose values are great and who’d do everything 
for the client but who are still rooted in the politics of the 1980s so they 
think the organisation has got to be collective and everyone should be 
consulted on everything and funders are always wrong and the LSC in 
particular is the devil incarnate – and it’s a culture which is still quite 
powerful within agencies and tends to influence people who come into it – so the 1980s politics still hold some sway and to some extent I think it’s a problem with quite a few voluntary agencies which hate us which 
is an impediment to establishing the partnership, the relationship of 
trust which the LSC and local authorities want.  I think the only way is 
just to be completely straight and say something like ‘look, buy into it, this is the way it is, it’s not a grant, it’s  a contract, and you have to think private sector because that’s the way the world is now’.  (CLS 
development worker)   
 
The laxity in terms of control over workers which this values base sometimes 
produced was also viewed by some as problematic, including by people within 
the sector:   
Other than LSC regulation there is no overall scheme (in the VCO sector).  If an advisor were in a solicitor agency then they’d be subject 
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to Law Society regulation and if they worked in immigration, to the OISC, but otherwise the NFP sector is very lightly regulated and it’s very 
variable – so, for instance there are different quality standards.  It’s 
partly a resource issue – apart from the NACAB which has money to audit, most ‘regulation’ comprises self accreditation systems.  But even 
with the CAB, I would question how effective it is, whether you can term 
it regulation as they rarely chuck anyone out. (National officer of a 
major advice consortium). 
  
A further tension between the NFP sector and the LSC centred on specifications of 
scope, frequently causing compliance problems.  For example, the embedded culture 
of universalism in some areas of social welfare law could mean that advisors found it 
distasteful to begin an interview with a question about means.  we like to give the same standard of service to all clients so we’ve not had people ring fenced, we’ve not had people just doing generalist work, 
people just doing specialist work or people just doing contract work or people just doing non contract work.  We’ve treated our clients the same, doing that we’ve had people, or the advice workers just dealing 
with anybody that comes through the door rather than internal referrals 
or internal signposting.  But when you look at the contract, the contract – my interpretation of the contract – is that you identify people who 
contribute to the contract and let the commission know, and that really hasn’t changed, you know even when they updated the contract in 2003 
or whenever it was.  But this new Account Manager is under the impression that the commission expects or the commission’s 
expectations through the contract are that people will be ring fenced.  But when I read the contract there’s no term ‘ring fenced’ in the contract so I don’t know where it comes from - apparently it’s a 
commission term.  But this is something that I suppose, from my point 
of view, needs to be further discussed with our new Account Manager 
because it can quite drastically change the culture of our work, the way 
we operate which would have knock on  effects with regards to service 
delivery and contract delivery and all sorts.  (Manager, Housing Advice 
Agency) 
 
The resistance to the erosion of universalism was intensified when the scope of 
eligible activity was seen as being defined too narrowly.  One example below covers 
means, the other covers the scope of activity: 
one of the big problems we have is the capital rule, because the capital 
rule for eligible work, the actual clients have to meet the capital rule, it’s currently something like £1200.  Anything above that and you’re only 
allowed to do sort of 45 minutes worth of work with them.  Now that 
capital level is actually below the poverty line benefit level because I 
think currently disregard on capital for income support is something like £3,000.  So it’s a poverty line which is even more stringent than the 
actual poverty benefits themselves and we certainly find that 
increasingly to be quite a serious problem for us.  Particularly as quite a 
lot of what we do is with the elderly and disabled for some reason.  Well I know why in the case of the elderly they’ve saved for a funeral and the 
money that they put aside for their own funeral that usually takes them 
over the capital limit for legal help.   
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the things they came up with was stuff that our advisors would have gone to the barricades over.  It was things like ‘you haven’t justified you’ve filled in a DLA form for this customer, you know it’s a simple form it doesn’t require help’.  Well, I mean, as far as our advisor is concerned that’s bread and butter welfare rights advice work helping 
people with forms.   Most people need help with forms, most people struggle with forms.  It’s not something you actually need to justify as 
being an exception, that’s the norm.  (Manager Welfare Rights Advice 
Service). 
 
As respondents from the LSC pointed out to us, the issue of scope was an issue of 
policy rather than an issue of audit, and was therefore, they argued, not a legitimate 
topic of complaint for NFP agencies, whereas for the NFP sector, limitations on scope 
were frequently felt to impact directly on an agency’s ‘mission’, the essential reason 
that they feel they are in business. 
 
NFP respondents also asserted that the regulatory burden resulting from the contract 
placed further constraints on the scope of work and the manner in which it could be 
performed (thereby playing a pivotal role in the ‘colonisation’ process. 8.  
 
As a result of these tensions between the character of the NFP sector and LSC 
objectives, there was evidence both from LSC staff and NFP respondents of a shift 
from the initial partnership approach and this was reflected in the degree of severity 
with which organizations might be audited. For instance, a CAB director perceived a 
change in approach from the 2 years prior, and complained that it had not been 
signalled: 
We performed at the same level for the last five years roughly and 
only for the last two years have did they begin to talk about quantity 
of hours, so - and I can understand from a use of public money point 
of view why they want us pay us an amount of money to perform to 
their contract requirement but if that were the case I think that could 
have been made clearer from earlier on, rather than a sudden bit of a 
culture shock when suddenly they’re emphasizing quantity..  They are 
emphasizing quantity and number of hours output and the same time that they are introducing time standards, so it’s like a big squeeze 
from both sides - those things happened right at the same time - last 
year - last year  
 
The increasing tension between the perception of the NFP sector as providing added 
value, and the imperative to achieve VFM, is reflected in this LSC Regional Manager’s 
comments: I’ve come across what I regard as adviser dependency syndrome; 
where the adviser does everything they can for the client and says do come back next week if there’s anything else – where I think the 
adviser is almost cleaving to the client rather than being driven by the client’s needs or god forbid the 50 other people in the waiting room desperately trying to get in.  Then there’s the issue of volunteers – 
                                                 
8 Power, 1997  Power’s point receives support from The Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF) 
studies which  have consistently identified administrative burdens imposed by regulation as 
hampering business, channelling resources away from more productive uses, and inhibiting 
innovation and growth (and thus diverting organisations from their primary purpose) 2005, p 
4; and see. BRTF, 2005a) specifically on the NFP sector; and Hampton 2005 
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how assertively can you supervise a volunteer; how do you deal with a  volunteer who says I didn’t come down here to fill in all these bloody 
forms for the LSC I came here to help people – so there are all sorts 
of cultural tensions there  
 Thus the initial endorsement of the NFP sector’s distinctive value and expertise based 
rationale, and the potential which it was originally envisaged these would create for 
new types of services, has in practice been constrained as a result of the 
implementation of measures which effectively curb their enactment.  Arguably this 
stems in large part  from the multiple functions which regulation is now expected to 
fulfil. On the one hand, at the micro-level, it is charged with ensuring that regulated 
services simultaneously deliver quality, VFM and responsiveness (each of which is 
not only a contested concept, but may require a different form of regulation). On the 
other hand, at the macro level, it connects with government concern with the ‘dependency culture’ exemplified by the targeting of social exclusion ‘through non-state bodies’ and suggests that in the future ‘responsibility for the social sector (will 
be) handed to voluntary organisations and business’ and that ‘VCS  adopts more business practices’ 9  Bolton has argued that this evolving situation creates tensions because ‘as the role of the state has changed from providing public services and 
utilities directly to ensuring that these are provided, so the focus of regulation has 
shifted from relatively simple questions of probity to more complex questions of performance’ (2002, p2).  
 
In the following section we consider the effect on the sector’s potential to support 
new avenues for legal services through an exploration of some aspects of the relationships in the ‘seamless web of advice’, between firms and VCOs and between 
the tiers of advice. 
 
Section 3: the nature of the relationship between the specialist expertise of 
second tier advisers and the triage function of the first tier advisers  
 
The issue of how to train the workforce for the publicly funded advice sector has yet 
to be fully explored.  Whilst it is possible to overstate the extent of the distinction 
between the training for the two sectors, the FP sector is dominated by a huge 
majority of fully qualified solicitors at the apex of the labour market, and the NFP 
sector by workers who, where they have experienced systematic initial training, have 
not received nationally recognised qualifications for it. The origins of some of the 
principal providers such as the CABx lay in a movement concerned to embed the 
principles of accessibility and universalism, as opposed to the exclusive model of 
professional expertise.  Correspondingly, training in the NFP sector attempts to avoid 
artificial entry barriers, has a functional bias grounded in a detailed specification of 
the occupational role, and also places a premium on absorption of organizational 
values, as well as knowledge and expertise very much focused on client need.   
 
Given these differences in the training base for the two sectors, the question arises 
of whether advisers in the FP sector are over-trained for publicly funded legal aid, 
whether NFP workers are under-trained, or whether the ‘market’ or reservoir of legal 
need eligible for public funding falls into different sectors requiring differing levels of 
expertise and training, and if so, what kind of infrastructure should bind these 
                                                 
9 BRTF, 2005 a, p 15 
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sectors together.  The concept of CLSPs 10, which were envisaged as the vehicle for developing the AJA’s aim of creating a ‘seamless web’ of advice services, has 
achieved uneven results in this regard: CLSP membership at the time of the Matrix 
evaluation indicated significant under-representation of solicitors in the partnership 
process (Matrix, 2004, p. 38), and the development of local partnerships as an 
infrastructure for networking advice provision tended to be correlated with the  
strength of previous arrangements and local authority commitment to the project.  
Difficulties in these partnerships at a local level, however, only reflect more 
widespread problems with the theory and mechanics of partnership between state 
and voluntary sector at the national level, problems which are reflected in the 
current debate over the potential impact of CLACs on the broader picture of the 
delivery of advice services by VCOs. 
 
We wish in this section to  pick up a specific issue on which we believe our data 
sheds some light, namely the importance of articulating first and second tier advice 
services: this is a crucial issue because of the significance of processes of  
concentrating and distributing expertise.  The development of specialist expertise in 
welfare law is a defining characteristic in the NfP sector’s involvement in legal aid.  
Whilst traditionally some specialist agencies have, since the 1960s, been able, with 
the aid of either charitable or local authority funds, to develop the specialist 
expertise of staff, notably in areas like welfare rights, housing and debt, the AJA 
1999 greatly increased the availability of resources for specialist advisers, and for 
the agencies included in our study, the LSC contract had become the cornerstone of 
their specialist provision.  However, the issue of the optimum approach to developing 
the relationship between specialist expertise and the gatekeepers represented by 
general advice workers remains contentious. 
 
Articulation can be inter-agency (say from a CAB or a solicitor to a specialist housing 
advice service) or intra-agency (for example between general rota advisers at a CAB 
and specialist advisor funded either through the LSC contract or direct local authority 
funding).  The most obvious mode of articulation is referral, but within agencies it 
can be effected through a process of case check and review: 
every case sheet, every client that is seen, has their case sheet recorded.  
Every case sheet is then quality checked by a paid member of staff.  
Either the – what’s called the advice session supervisor who does 2 days a 
week – or if she doesn’t do it whichever one of the three of us has done 
her 3rd session in the week, so for example I’ve got a pile still to read from 
yesterday of the ** (name of town)  clients and a couple that we did at 
the end of yesterday afternoon, 2 or 3 actually that I haven’t read. So I 
will read those, I will check off the advice given, I will check off the 
information and I will send the feedback – not a feedback form – a follow up note if there’s anything that still needs doing, or if they’ve got anything manifestly incorrect, or if they’ve not filled in the case sheet correctly, if they’ve not done it so that I can understand it I’ll go back to them and say ‘you know you really didn’t make sense of this’. 
 
                                                 
10 CLSPs were piloted in six areas prior to the AJA, 1999, and formed a formal part of new Legal Aid arrangements from 2000: they were networks of local advice providers, intended to include the LSC, local authorities, local solicitors’ firms providing legally aided advice and assistance, CABx, law centres and other advice providers.  Their primary role was to carry out an analysis of legal ‘need’, assess how well 
current provision met this need, to develop a strategic plan to prioritise the meeting of legal need locally, and to support and encourage the 
development of local networks and active referral systems.  Participation in CLSPs has been voluntary however, which has resulted in a 
variable degree of effectiveness (Matrix, 2004, pp 38-52). 
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This process of 100% case review facilitates a check on quality of advice, and the 
need for training, but also, crucially, whether the full extent of the problem has been 
identified: however this is post hoc, and has the ultimate aim of improving the 
efficiency of first line referrals.   The gatekeeping function of first line advisers can be 
seen as analogous to the function of the triage nurse in Accident and Emergency 
healthcare settings, where cases are categorized and sorted in line with established 
processes and algorithms with in order to achieve efficient use of specialist expertise, 
and also in order to develop risk averse systems. 
 Issues which arose in the course of our research which reflected on this ‘triage’ 
function included the personalist character of some referral networks, and the 
expertise base of referring generalist workers.  At a general level, we found some cultural barriers to effective referral between some advice agencies and solicitors’ 
firms. This confirms the findings of Moorhead and Robinson’s study of legal ‘problem clusters’, in which they noted that advisers were not dealing with problems ‘seamlessly’  and the less expertise the organization possessed, the less likely they 
were to make the appropriate connections (2006, p 3).  This issue of the expertise 
required to signpost is something we will return to below.  
 
Where systems of referral functioned effectively some of the participants conducted 
them on the basis of experience and trust.  The following CAB manager, asked about 
the basis for referral, stated that it was dependent on: 
an individual within that firm.  Our relationship with, ** will come and do our training or we can ring up and say I’ve got this chap, he’s just walked out or he’s just been dismissed or what not, what do you think I should 
do? - She’ll either say send him up or whatever.  But that’s a relationship that we’ve built up on a personal basis, its nothing to do with CLSP 
Interviewer: And if that person moves on its gone? Yes it’s gone completely.  We have built up relationships with different 
solicitors over the years and as the solicitors have moved away that 
relationship has just come to an end. 
 
Without the personal link, the referring agencies shared the problem of information 
asymmetry commonly identified as that most commonly facing the consumers of 
professional services: 
we pass them on to solicitors with no mechanism for them saying yes this is a good case and so on, partly because of the time involved….  We 
did have one solicitor who would send back a report every so often to say ‘ you sent me five clients and three we are taking to tribunal, the other two I gave advice’ and she eventually stopped because she obviously doesn’t have the time either. 
 
Elements of mistrust entered some of the network relationships at some points often based on stereotypical views of each others’ expertise and disposition.  Solicitors 
tended to view the legal expertise of NFP workers negatively and to feel that they 
spent excessive amounts of time over assessing problems without necessarily 
coming up with the right diagnosis: 
what staggered me, because we also do a free advice clinic linked to 
CAB, is that you find that people are prepared to sit for three, four or 
five hours in a CAB to wait for half an hours worth of advice, because they’re so frightened of going to the lawyers, and I think we would give 
better advice and more prompt advice. Because we know what to look 
for.  My wife helps at an Advice Centre in * and the CAB there see 
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people and they allow an hour for each visit, and I would hope that we 
could get to the nub of a problem in half that time, and then they want 
another hour to be able to write up their notes.  Now, you know, I think 
that we can do that better. 
 
This view was actually echoed by the manager of a housing advice agency in the 
same town, indicating that there was a genuine cultural difference between the two 
sectors: 
I think solicitors do work very differently from the NfP sector.  I did have 
an issue not that long ago and I was fascinated with how the solicitor 
dealt with that issue – I know that if someone had come in here  - well he did in half an hour what would’ve taken three or four hours for an advice worker to go through and that’s about being very blunt, very direct  ‘Tell me what happened .. Right .. I’m writing this letter ..’ and that’s a very focused way of looking at it. 
 
An employment specialist in a firm in a neighbouring town identified a problem as 
the lack of some of the basic disciplines and case handling skills which tended to be 
inculcated in solicitors at an early stage of their vocational training: 
I think the quality of advice from the CAB here in * is absolutely dire – 
well at least in employment – the number of times you have to ring up the woman * .. what’s her name .. and say I’m going to be writing to you about these files, you’ve  missed the time limits, you haven’t done this .. or you get people who come to you and they’ve been to the CAB 
and somebody voluntarily has taken one of their  standard letters and 
actually queered the pitch of the case ..and they don’t even write them 
up .. type them up – what they do is get the proforma, and at the top it’s got ‘for use for this’ and at the bottom it’s got all the advice the CAB 
gives about what you should do, and they send that to the employer ..the employer comes in to see me with one of these and he’s almost laughing because it gives the tactics away .. it’s just silly .. sloppy 
 
Whilst it is likely that these kinds of views reflect in part the need for legal 
professionals to bolster their own sense of worth, the impact on the processes of 
networking and referral are the same as if they were in every instance justified.  The 
issue of expertise had a more specific significance in terms of one key area of 
provision in which one of our firms specialized, namely community care and 
education.  The senior partner of this specialist firm defined this area of law as 
innovative public interest work, where the specialist expertise would often lie in using 
the Human Rights Act and Judicial Review to place before the courts injustices which 
were the consequences of administrative discretion by local authorities which would 
otherwise go unchallenged.  Moorhead and Robinson have noted the extent to which 
the problems of legal need result from the action or inaction of a local authority 
(2006).  The senior partner of this firm was of the view that these administrative 
decisions in the areas of education and community care are often left unchallenged 
by NFP agencies because of lack of confidence and a belief that local authorities are 
unlikely to have made mistakes.  He provided one specific example which is worth 
quoting at length: so I do child care work and quite often you don’t get joined up thinking in 
childcare, you get – child protection will look at the parent with learning disabilities and say (to the parent?)‘this child is at risk here’.  Very rarely 
do they bring in their learning disability service, and very rarely, in any 
case, do they consider what – well the parents might have failed – but 
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there’s no suggestion that the local authority, for example, have 
obligations to get the children statemented earlier, to perhaps provide 
respite care, to look what services ought to be provided in a joined up way.  And we’re able to say – I’m able to talk to my colleagues – and say ‘well what should they have done in these circumstances’, and to try to put a different slant on it.  But again, because it’s such a very narrow area of law most judges, most barristers, in this area it’s a surprise to learn 
that there is legislation which doesn’t just govern under section 47 of 
National Health Service Community Care Act, creates a mandatory – if you 
once prepare proper community care plan – that’s mandatory upon the local authority to provide it.  It’s not a target duty.  So it is about building specialisms and making sure that we can say ‘look we are different’ even though we’re a relatively small firm, that we can deal with these issues 
which is why we get referrals now from, as I say, from across the country. 
 
A specialist housing solicitor identified another cultural distinction which he argued 
affected the capacity of the NfP sector to handle representation roles (and this 
narrative was related to his objection to bringing the NfP sector into a local duty 
scheme for housing cases.)   This distinction revolved around the ability to claim 
ownership of the public space in a courtroom or tribunal: 
It is my space and I take no nonsense from anyone because I am an officer of 
the court – so I have as much right as them (the judges) to be there but when 
the voluntary sector person goes in they feel as if they have no such right and that’s true of course.  They are there at the grace of the judge and that 
tempers the way they behave.   
Interviewer: What do you mean? 
They are over gracious, they don’t challenge and that’s aside from whether they 
have the expertise. The thing if you go into court on license then that affects 
the way that you behave and you can see that because they allow things to happen that we wouldn’t allow.  
 
These barriers represent a considerable obstacle to the kind of inter-agency 
cooperation which CLSPs were originally designed to encourage.  Whether the move 
to a more market driven approach on the one hand, or the highly structured 
cooperation of CLACs on the other, will exacerbate or ameliorate these tensions is 
open to debate. 
 
We will now return briefly to the processes of intra-agency referral.  Specialist 
advisers in all the VCO agencies we studied were seen as an important training 
resource, particularly as training budgets came under strain, the result, it was often 
argued, of  the failure of contracts to recognise the full cost of the delivery of 
services.  In CABx the salaried specialists were an important source of up to date 
information for volunteer workers, and a means of communicating to volunteers 
where the limits of their capability lay.  This was particularly the case in CABx which 
operated satellite advice centres in remote areas.   Under local authority funding 
regimes it was argued that specialist workers had opportunities both to make links 
with regional and national specialist networks and to disseminate their expertise.  
However, several of the NfP agencies identified elements of the LSC contract as 
militating against these arrangements: the ‘ring-fencing of contract staff’ and problems which managers and workers identified in ‘making the hours’ had led 
several specialists to withdraw from networks, and to cease any training functions.  
Some agencies attempted to surmount this problem by distributing a contract 
between more than one worker: this was however only possible for specialist 
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agencies (since even quite large CABx might not employ more than one specialist in 
any area), and in one case, noted above, an agency reported being asked to restrict 
the contract to a single worker following a critical audit. 
 
In our discussions with agencies concerning the training and skill acquisition of 
advice workers certain themes recurred.  One was the age profile of the workforce 
and the difficulties in recruitment, partly due to the ceiling on salaries for specialist 
advisers in the region of around £20,000 per annum.  A second was the importance 
of mentoring and supervision by skilled advisers in the development of new 
specialists, and the time consuming nature of this form of training.  
 
A specific example was provided by one of the specialist housing agencies involved in 
the study, which had just received two new CLS contracts: one to open up a centre 
in a neighbouring town which was regarded as a ‘desert’ for housing advice, and one 
to provide representation at County Court.  The agency Director argued that the set-
up costs of the former had not been fully recognised however, and in the latter case 
there was a proviso that the agency service the advocacy with their most skilled and 
experienced advisors.  This meant backfilling the posts vacated by these advisors in 
order to ensure that the standard service did not suffer.  The agency Director 
estimated that the cost of getting these advisors in place, including training up, and 
diminished case loading during training, were £20,000.  Eventually he had managed 
to obtain £800 from the LSC to cover these costs, but he argued that in addition to 
the financial loss, the training capability of the agency was diminished because the 
most skilled workers were no longer able make their expertise available for training 
up their colleagues. 
 
In this section we have attempted to underscore the significance of the way in which 
first and second tier advice are articulated, and the importance of the relationships 
which facilitate that articulation.  Most of our respondents argued that effective 
access to justice depended on the existence of clear routes from initial advice 
through to specialist expertise, although there was less agreement on the way in 
which these routes might be constructed.  The relationships between the tiers was 
also seen as crucial to the functions of training and ensuring succession.  One 
perspective identified the unintended consequences of some aspects of contract 
compliance management for these relationships, indicating that organizational 
change may indirectly affect quality through processes which are at the moment 
imperfectly understood. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has approached Access to Justice through discussion of the new avenues 
for services resulting from the introduction of the NFP sector into the legal aid sector.  In many government policy documents, the concepts of ‘access to justice’ and ‘improving the reach of legal services’ are used as though they were synonymous, in the same way that the designations of ‘citizen’ and ‘consumer’ are often treated as 
interchangeable.  The relationship between the two sets of ideas is more complex and problematic, however.  The concept of ‘justice’ is related in the minds of most 
people, and most users of the justice system, as related to an outcome to a specific 
matter.  Genn found that of those taking action to pursue a justiciable matter, 51% 
had a specific objective related to money, goods or property, with smaller 
proportions (between 5% and 8%) being concerned with achieving outcomes related  
to jobs, divorce or separation and enforcing rights (1999, p. 183).  However other 
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research indicates that people’s sense of justice also relates to the quality11 of 
service provided, their sense of ownership of a case, and being treated with respect 
(for instance, Tyler and Lind, 1988; Sommerlad and Wall, 1999).  Arguably the 
potential for the NFP sector to realise both these aims was originally fundamental to 
the partnership with the LSC, since the NFP ethos was concerned at a fundamental 
level with the sort of democratisation and modernisation  of legal services which the 
LSC hoped to achieve.  However the tensions discussed above between this ethos 
and the countervailing VFM ethos appear to have circumscribed the extent to which 
the NFP sector has been able to act as a creative new form of legal service.  
Similarly, the difficulties the contract poses to triage have been accentuated by the 
market based ideology of LSC policy (see, eg, Frontier Economics, 2003), realised 
through the introduction of increased competition, and therefore conflicts of interest, 
between providers, and this is likely to prove dysfunctional for the idea of 
networking, unless it can be incentivized. 
 The concept of providing ‘legal advice services’, however, does not imply any 
necessary outcome beyond the provision of advice itself.  The modality of the advice 
service and the nature of the problem may combine to result in a just outcome, and 
in certain forms, this process will be easy to trace (the files recording face to face 
advice work and outcomes will be susceptible to peer review); in others, it will be 
less so (as will be the case with telephone advice).  The expansion of ‘legal services’ 
therefore has no necessary correlation with an increase in just outcomes.  However, certain forms of ‘legal service provision’ (telephone advice, web-based services, 
some forms of mediation) give the appearance of being cost-efficient and of 
empowering the stakeholder, and may therefore represent more attractive service 
avenues than face to face case work, but it would be unwise to directly read from an 
increase in these services an increase in access to justice. 
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